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I. INTRODUCTION
Wildlife agents occupy a unique place in law enforcement. Their
primary responsibility is not to make the streets safe but to protect and
ensure the regulated harvesting of wild fauna. Whether based in an
upland region or in a coastal parish, wildlife agents spend their days
and nights on patrol, often serving as the sole means of protecting the
state's game and fish resources and of ensuring the safety of sportsmen.
Virtually every hunting and fishing activity has some licensing or
permit requirement. There are also both daily and seasonal limits on
the amount of particular fauna that can be legally taken by an individual.
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Louisiana wildlife agents also have a statutory obligation to enforce the
boating safety laws.' Wildlife agents are aware that many individuals
incorporate boats into their hunting activities, so agents often make a
brief game and fish inspection when checking boats to ensure compliance
with the minimum safety standards.
The most common and effective method of enforcing these laws is
through random "field stops" effected by wildlife agents. Typically the
agent stops an individual2 who appears to be either hunting or fishing,
requests his or her license, and inspects any game or fish possessed to
ensure legality. Agents operating in coastal regions of the state also
inspect the licenses and catch of commercial fishermen and shrimpers.
They also check boats for the required safety equipment while at the
launch and on the water.
Virtually all of these stops are made without either probable cause
or a reasonable suspicion to suspect that the individual is in violation
of any law. In light of the present law concerning random stops or
checks by traditional law enforcement agencies, concerns as to the con-
stitutionality of the stops made by wildlife agents have arisen. To pro-
mote a better understanding of the application of traditional search and
seizure law to wildlife agents, this comment will discuss the federal and
comparative state jurisprudence addressing this issue. The comment will
then discuss the state of the law in Louisiana. The remainder of the
comment will attempt to resolve some of the conflicts presented by the
jurisprudence, suggesting several different analyses of random field stops
which support the reasonableness of this practice under both the United
States and Louisiana Constitutions.
II. RANDOM SEIZURES AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fourth Amend-
ment applies only when a seizure occurs.4 When analyzing the consti-
1. See La. R.S. 34:851.29 (1985), discussed infra at note 109.
2. These stops are made of individuals who are on foot, who are driving in or
around an area known to support hunting, and who are in boats.
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
4. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a seizure occurs when a government agent has
"in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16,




tutionality of a seizure under this amendment, a court must make an
initial distinction between investigations of possible criminal violations
and inspections made in relation to an administrative scheme. The dif-
ferent natures of these intrusions has resulted in the development of
two distinct lines of cases addressing random stops by both traditional
police agencies and wildlife agents.
A. Criminal Investigations
The United States Supreme Court addressed random stops by tra-
ditional police agencies in Delaware v. Prouse.1 Prouse challenged the
constitutionality of random driver's license "spotchecks" by roving police
patrolmen. With neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to
believe that a particular car was being operated in violation of motor
vehicle laws, police were stopping vehicles and inspecting the driver's
license. Such "spot-checks" were held to be unconstitutional because
the "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" was
not offset by the "promotion of legitimate governmental interests." ' 6 In
analyzing the stop, the Court noted the inefficiency of the method used7
and the fact that the officers had virtually "unbridled discretion" as
to which vehicles they chose to stop.8
However, stops made without probable cause at a stationary check-
point were upheld several years later in Michigan v. Sitz.9 The Court
relied on Prouse to test the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint.
The roadblock was conducted pursuant to guidelines which limited much
of the discretion of the officers. Also, the roadblock involved only a
brief detention of the vehicles and was more efficient than the random
stops considered in Prouse. In light of these factors, the roadblock
satisfied the criteria of Prouse and was found reasonable.
The Court also defined the parameters of reasonable random stops
in a line of cases concerning Border Patrol activities. Border Patrol
agents were randomly stopping cars near the Mexican border to check
for illegal aliens. The Court held that a roving patrol unit could only
search a vehicle in the vicinity of the border if there was probable cause
to believe that it contained illegal aliens. 0 Roving patrols were, however,
allowed to stop motorists in the general area of the border to inquire
5. 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
6. Id. at 653-54, 99 S. Ct. at 1396.
7. Id. at 659, 99 S. Ct. at 1399 ("Absent some empirical data to the contrary, it
must be assumed that finding an unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic
violations is a much more likely event than finding an unlicensed driver by choosing
randomly from the entire universe of drivers." Id.).
8. Id. at 661, 99 S. Ct. at 1400.
9. 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
10. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973).
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into the resident status of those in the car when there was reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that the car contained illegal
aliens." The Court took a different position regarding fixed checkpoints
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.'2 Here, the Court allowed Border
Patrol agents at fixed checkpoints on the border to stop, question, and
visually inspect all vehicles passing through them despite the lack of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Court has recognized that
Border Patrol agents enjoy a greater leeway than traditional police
agencies in these areas only because of the importance of border control
and the role of these activities in achieving that end.
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 4 the Court addressed sim-
ilar activities by the United States Coast Guard. A federal statute au-
thorizes customs officials to board any vessel at any time and at any
place in the United States to examine the vessel's manifest and other
documents. 5 Upon boarding a ship pursuant to this statute, customs
officials accompanying the Coast Guard discovered bales of marijuana.' 6
Under "the overarching principle[s] of 'reasonableness' embodied in the
Fourth Amendment," the Court reasoned "that the important factual
differences between vessels located in waters offering ready access to
the open sea and automobiles on principal thoroughfares [was] sufficient
to require a different result" than that of Prouse. 7 The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of both the statute and the seizure of the
marijuana.
The above authority provides a consistent test used by the United
States Supreme Court in weighing the constitutionality of a random
stop-the balancing of the promotion of legitimate governmental interests
against the intrusion of the procedure, the efficiency of the procedure,
and the discretion afforded the individual officers. 8 Though the re-
sponsibilities of wildlife agents and traditional police officers differ, the
limited case law addressing parallel activity by wildlife agents indicates
11. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).
12. 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
13. Id. at 556-57, 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
14. 462 U.S. 579, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1988).
16. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 583, 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
17. Id. at 588, 103 S. Ct. at 2579-80.
18. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979). The cases
leading to this point differ in most every aspect of the balancing test: the governmental
interest varies from the regular police investigations of Prouse, to the viability of the
border, to the regulation of the territorial waters or tax collection of Villamonte-Marquez;
the methods used are both stationary and mobile; and the limits of the agent's actions
are statutory, (Villamonte-Marquez) administratively established (Sitz), and left to the
agent's gut-feelings (Prouse). The balancing of interests in each case differed accordingly,
as did the result.
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that the same constitutional mandates and tests apply to both groups.
However, in a concurring opinion to Prouse, Justices Blackmun and
Powell felt that it was important to distinguish the analysis used in
cases involving wildlife agents from that used when traditional police
agencies were involved:
I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws
any constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat indi-
vidualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game
wardens in the performance of their duties. In a situation of
that type, it seems to me, the Court's balancing process, and
the value factors under consideration, would be quite different.19
Despite this suggestion, federal and state courts continue to apply the
Prouse balancing process when determining the constitutionality of ran-
dom checks by wildlife agents. However, because the Supreme Court
has not defined the different "value factors" to be balanced, somewhat
contradictory results have occurred in both court systems.
1. Random Stops By Wildlife Agents Under Prouse in the
Federal Courts
Even before Prouse put the balancing of governmental interests
against individual rights in the forefront of search and seizure law,
federal courts were using this approach when random checks by wildlife
agents were challenged. In United States v. Greenhead,20 United States
Fish and Wildlife Service agents were checking all of the hunting clubs
in their area at the end of duck season to ensure that the clubs were
complying with the tagging and possession laws. The agents unlocked
a gate and entered the land of Greenhead (a hunting club) without any
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. The court affirmed the admission of
evidence consisting of illegally taken and possessed ducks obtained as
a result of the search. 2'
The Greenhead court used a balancing test identical to that used in
Prouse as a means of upholding the constitutionality of the actions of
the wildlife agents. The court cited the United States Supreme Court
opinion of Johnson v. United States 2 as authority for applying this
type of test in weighing the legality of the entry made by the agents
into the camp. The court stated that 'It]here are exceptional circum-
stances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement
19. Id. at 664, 99 S. Ct. at 1401 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. 256 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
21. Id. at 894.
22. 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948).
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against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's
warrant for search may be dispensed with."' 23
Conceding that no probable cause existed, the court found this of
no consequence in light of the potential consequences of ineffective game
management:
I would have supposed that as true sportsmen the members of
Greenhead, Inc., would have welcomed the Wardens on their
property in order to make certain that wild ducks do not go
the way of the heath hen and the passenger pigeon, if for no
other good reason. And, of course, as law-abiding citizens I
would have supposed that they would have wanted to be certain
that no ohe had violated the law on their premises. 24
The judge felt that the agents "were simply doing what I suspect all
good game management men do during the hunting season-'just looking
around,"' and that their efforts "ought not be stultified by grossly
expanded concepts of the right of privacy.' '25 Presaging Prouse, the
court reasoned that the minimal intrusion onto the land and into the
camp was too slight to offset the importance of the agent's duties.
In Davis v. Reynolds, the court used the theory of Greenhead to
uphold a Florida regulation granting state wildlife agents the authority
to stop and search any vehicle on state operated game preserves. 26 The
plaintiffs in Davis sought to enjoin enforcement of the regulation. 27 The
court denied the injunction by stating that the plaintiff's presence on
the management area "diminished his right to privacy." 28 Consequently,
the situation then fell "within [one of] those enumerated cases where
Fourth Amendment standards have been relaxed to promote the public
welfare and security." '29
After Davis, it seems clear that one's expectation of privacy will be
diminished, if not eliminated, while engaging in a highly regulated activity
on state managed land. But not all federal courts share this view. In
United States v. Munoz,30 the Ninth Circuit held that the practice of
stopping all vehicles in National Parks to check wood permits, inquire
about park use, and check for game violations was contrary to the
Fourth Amendment. In Munoz, a state "game trooper" discovered an
23. Greenhead, 256 F. Supp. at 893 (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-15, 685 S.
Ct. at 369).
24. Id. at 891 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 891, 894.
26. 319 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id.
30. 701 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983).
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illegally taken golden eagle as well as an illegally taken deer while making
a random stop. Despite the high governmental interest in protecting
threatened species such as the golden eagle, the court felt the intrusion
was too great."' The court relied on Prouse to determine that the method
employed by the trooper did not sufficiently serve the governmental
interest of deterring the misuse of national forest resources.3 2 In rejecting
arguments similar to those used in Davis, the court noted that "[i]n
light of the fact that Congress established national parks in part to
preserve for people a setting for respite and reflection, there is irony
in the contention that federal regulations governing the use ...of the
parks ...cause a diminished expectation of privacy."3 The court also
rejected the theory that the "pervasively-regulated industry exception"
to the usual Fourth Amendment requirements applied.14 According to
the court, the cases recognizing this exception were premised "on a
consent implicit in a business-man's participation in a regulated industry"' ,
and were thus inapplicable to the facts presented.
3 6
2. State Court Applications of Prouse
Some of the state supreme courts that have upheld random checks
performed by wildlife agents have also done so by using the Prouse
balancing test. The Oregon case of State v. Tourtillott" is in the forefront
on the state level. Tourtillot recognizes a limited exception to probable
cause requirements for wildlife agents. Addressing a challenge to a
random game checkpoint stop, the court used a balancing test similar
to that of Prouse. An officer of the Oregon State Police Game Division
stopped the plaintiff at a roadblock set up to check hunters' compliance
with game laws and found that she was driving without a license. In
deciding that the checkpoint was not violative of constitutional provi-
sions, the court held that "the governmental interest in the enforcement
31. Id. at 1301.
32. Id.
33, Id. at 1298.
34. Id. at 1298-99.
35. Id. at 1299.
36. It is important to note here the "open fields" doctrine described by the Court
in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). This doctrine provides
that a government intrusion into the open fields is not an "unreasonable search" proscribed
by the Constitution, as an individual has no expectation of privacy in the open fields.
Id. at 182-83, 104 S. Ct. at 1743. United States v. Wylder, 590 F. Supp. 926 (D.C. Or.
1984), held that a Fish and Wildlife Service agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment
by entering onto private land without probable cause for the purpose of performing routine
license checks (citing Oliver). If Wylder was correct, Greenhead and Munoz could each
have been decided using this doctrine; if so, the result of Greenhead would be the same,
but Munoz would apparently change.
37. 618 P.2d 423 (Or. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972, 101 S. Ct. 2051 (1981).
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of laws for the preservation of wildlife in this state is sufficiently
substantial to justify the minimal intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment
rights of those stopped for brief questioning and a visual inspection of
their vehicles.' '3
When addressing the Prouse requirements, the court indicated that
this result was based more on necessity than on the traditional approach
of deferring to the interests of the individual. a9 The intrusion on the
rights of the individual by the stop was also de minimus, which made
the stop less offensive to the court.4 The need of the government to
protect dwindling wildlife resources offset the minimal intrusion of asking
a few questions and inspecting any required licenses. The agent's dis-
cretion was limited in this instance since the roadblock was set during
hunting season in an area frequented by hunters and the agent stopped
or slowed all approaching vehicles. 4'
The Tourtillott court also discussed why the "regulated industry"
or administrative search exception did not apply to the facts of the
case. One reason was that there was no "search" of the defendant. 42
Another reason was that the court felt the case law surrounding ad-
ministrative searches "arose from efforts to conduct warrantless searches
of premises" and not of automobiles or individuals. 43 In any event, at
least as far as the Tourtillott court was concerned, "[tihe result should
not turn on whether the criminal law or the administrative law [is] being
enforced."44
In State v. Halverson,45 the South Dakota Supreme Court followed
the reasoning of Tourtillott by stressing that necessity required that these
random stationary stops be made without probable cause.46 A state
statute granted wildlife agents the right to inspect game animals in the
possession of any person. 47 The court found: "The only effective means
of implementing this statute is by the use of road blocks or check point
stops in game areas. Stops on probable cause would not satisfy the
38. Id. at 430.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; Although the correctness of the court's conclusions is certainly debatable,
several other state courts have cited the analysis used in Tourtillott with approval in
upholding random checks by wildlife agents. See Orr v. People, 803 P.2d 509, 512 (Colo.
1990); State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1988); State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d
1181, 1184-85 (Me. 1990); Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987).
42. Tourtillot, 618 P.2d at 431.
43. Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 434.
45. 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979).




purpose of the law since the number of hunters is large and game
officers few." 4
s
The Halverson court also recognized that a "hunter tacitly consents
to the inspection of any game animal in his possession when he makes
application for and receives a hunting license." ' 49 This was only dicta,
however, in that it did not address the facts of the case; the defendant
was not hunting but was merely passing through the area. Commenting
on the "slight" interruption of the travels of the non-hunter and the
"public interest in the management and conservation of wildlife," 50 the
court simply used the Prouse test to find the stop legal.
B. Administrative Inspections
The United States Supreme Court has also discussed and recognized
the constitutionality of random administrative investigatory checks. These
checks differ from investigations of criminal activity in that they are
premised on the police power of the state, which encompasses furthering
public health, safety, and welfare through regulations and agencies.,' In
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 2 the Court established
the framework of a reasonable administrative search and held that
administrative searches are reasonable when the government's interest in
enforcing administrative regulations outweighs the limited intrusiveness
of the search. 3 Three factors were considered: a long history of both
judicial and public acceptance of the particular type of search, a state
interest in preventing the conditions with no alternative means of en-
forcement, and inspections impersonal in nature and not aimed at dis-
covering evidence of a crime.54 A warrant allowing the search, however,
was still required.
Nevertheless, later cases involving inspections of businesses subjected
to pervasive government regulation recognized an exception to the war-
rant requirement of administrative searches. New York v. Burger" de-
scribes the factors which allow this exception: the inspection is authorized
by a statute which limits inspector discretion, the government has a
substantial interest in the area, and the "certainty and regularity" of
the program provides an adequate substitute for a warrant.5 The in-
48. Id.
49. Id, at 724-25.
50. Id. at 725.
51. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77, 90 S. Ct. 774,
776-77 (1970).
52. 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
53. Id. at 536-37, 87 S. Ct. at 1735.
54. Id. at 537, 87 S. Ct. at 1735.
55. 482 U.S. 691, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
56. Id. at 702-03, 107 S. Ct. at 2644 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
600, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2539 (1981) (alteration in original)).
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spections must also be 'necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme."'17
The Court addressed administrative searches further in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association. 8 The Court recognized an ex-
ception to the probable cause requirement "when 'special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable.' 5 9 Skinner indicated that this justifi-
cation is based on a balancing of "governmental and privacy interests
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements
in the particular context."' 6 If the balancing indicates that a person's
expectation of privacy is minimal, that governmental interests are sub-
stantial, and that those governmental interests would be frustrated by
an individualized suspicion requirement, the search may be reasonable
even if conducted without reasonable suspicion.
Illinois has used the Skinner approach to uphold random mobile
stops by wildlife agents. In People v. Layton,61 a challenge to evidence
obtained by wildlife agents conducting random spotchecks of hunters
was decided with a "special needs" analysis similar to that of Skinner.62
The court rejected a Prouse-type approach, reasoning that "Prouse had
nothing to do with game wardens searching for game violations. '63
Analogizing hunting to a "highly regulated business," the court reasoned
that those involved had a diminished expectation of privacy.6 After
recognizing the inherent difficulties involved with searches by wildlife
agents and rejecting a pure "administrative search" analysis, the court
established A narrow exception to the warrant requirement: "In this
State, hunting is highly regulated, arguably more so than driving. Hunt-
ing is a privilege, not a right, to which licensing requirements apply.
Because of the nature of hunting, we conclude that licensing (or hunting
without a license) may be deemed consent to some intrusions." 65 The
Layton court further noted that this exception, as they recognized it,
is "limited to conservation and game officers pursuing game violations-
and does not extend to law enforcement officers generally-and is an
exception because of necessity."16
57. Id. at 702, 107 S. Ct. at 2644.
58. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
59. Id. at 619, 109 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873,
107 S. Ct. 3164, 3167 (1987) (quoting N.J. v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733,
748 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))).
60. Id.
61. 552 N.E.2d 1280 (Il1. App. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (1990).
62. See discussion supra text accompanying note 58.
63. Layton, 552 N.E.2d at 1284.
64. Id. at 1286.




This "implied consent" analysis required adding another element to
the discussion in the case. The court commented on a "hunter's profile"
which it felt provided the indicia of consent. 67 This element required
the additional steps of defining the profile and determining if it was
reasonably applied to the situation. 61 Such a limitation is a good idea
because of the empirical limits it places upon those employing it and
the ease with which abuse is uncovered.
In State v. Keehnere9 the highest Iowa court also distinguished Prouse
and relied on an administrative exception approach. The court said that
"the stop was, in fact, not truly 'random' because it "resulted from
the statutory authority granted to conservation officers to request and
inspect hunting licenses." ' 70 The court supplemented this position with
a finding that "an individual engaging in activity that may reasonably
be interpreted as hunting knows that he or she may be stopped briefly
and asked to display a license." ' 7' Any "[eixpectations to the contrary
are unreasonable. "72
C. Statutory Authority as a Constitutional Requirement
The discussion in Keehner of the statutory authority of the wildlife
agent raises another issue: what effect does the statutory authority
granted to an agent have on the validity of the stop? Munoz mentioned
the fact that there was no statutory authorization for the procedure and
indicated that this alone would be enough to find the actions of the
agent unreasonable. 7 The issue of statutory authority was also discussed
in Langle v. Bingham,74 where the court found that a Vermont wildlife
agent had exceeded his statutory authority by entering a barn and seizing
potentially illegally taken venison from a freezer. Noting that "[a] game
warden is not a general enforcement officer of the State of Vermont;
his authority is wholly derived from the state statutes," the court found
the seizure to be in violation of Langle's constitutional rights. 7
67. Id.
68. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) for a discussion
on the use of profiles in law enforcement.
69. 425 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1988).
70. Id. at 44.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1983). The Louisiana
Supreme Court has also indicated that this is a controlling factor in weighing the rea-
sonableness of any action by a wildlife agent in State v. Longlois, 374 So. 2d 1208 (La.
1979), discussed infra note 93.
74. 447 F. Supp. 934 (D.C. Vt. 1978)
75. Id. at 939.
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United States v. Wylder?6 presents an anomaly to this line of cases.
The court dismissed the defendant's claim that Section 706 of the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act 77 imposed a separate requirement that the agent
have a warrant before entering the camp."s The court held that since
the Fourth Amendment did nqt require probable cause, Section 706
could not require a warrant. 79
The authority has been found to exist implicitly in the Mississippi
statutory scheme. The statute granting wildlife agents authority to con-
duct searches when they have probable cause was interpreted to deal
only "with searches, not with seizures."' 0 As a result, the initial stop
by a wildlife agent was not limited only to situations in which the agent
had probable cause. Citing Tourtillott and Halverson's "only effective
means" discussion,"' the court indicated its belief that "[w]ithout such
checks, there is no reason to suppose that Mississippi would have any
more success in enforcing its game laws than South Dakota would." 2
Either via Prouse or the "administrative inspection" exception to
the Fourth Amendment, these courts have indicated that the importance
of effective game and fish management is paramount to the minimal
intrusions it causes. Almost all of the discussions include a review of
the statutory authority granted to the agent. Louisiana decisions also
view statutory authority as a controlling element, but have not yet clearly
established the relationship of game management and the intrusions that
accompany it.
III. THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION, SEIZURES, AND WILDLIFE AGENTS
The foundation of Louisiana's search and seizure law is Article 1,
Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. s3 Though the provision
76. 590 F. Supp. 926, 928 (D.C. Or. 1984).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). This section provides in part:
Any employee of the Department of the Interior authorized by the Secretary
of the Interior to enforce the provisions of this subchapter shall have power,
without warrant, to arrest any person committing a violation of this subchapter
... and shall have authority, with a search warrant, to search any place.
78. Wylder, 590 F. Supp. at 927-28.
79. Id.
80. Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916,
107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987).
81. Id. at 297.
82. Id.
83. La. Const. art. I, § 5 reads:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to.raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
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parallels the Fourth Amendment, it is not simply a duplication of the
federal protections. Article 1, Section 5 represents a decision by Louisiana
citizens to give a "higher standard of individual liberty than that afforded
by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution. 8 4 This is
evidenced by both the text of the Section and the application of it by
Louisiana courts.
A. Random Stops in Louisiana
The core of Louisiana jurisprudence surrounding random investi-
gative stops by police agencies is found in State v. Church85 and State
v. Parms.8 6 These two cases are the Louisiana correlative of Prouse.
Both cases deal with the constitutionality of random DWI roadblocks
by police. Parms held that a random DWI roadblock was violative of
the Fourth Amendment. Applying Prouse, the court cited the lack of
neutral criteria governing the officers involved, the complete discretion
as to the detention of any automobile, and the apparent ineffectiveness
of such a roadblock.8 7 The court found this particular roadblock un-
constitutional under Prouse, and left the door open as to whether the
practice in general is violative of the Louisiana Constitution.8
State v. Church,89 handed down nine months later, answered the
question left open by Parms. Analyzing a DWI roadblock conducted
pursuant to carefully drawn administrative guidelines, the court held
that "the seizure occurred without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to believe that defendant Church had violated some law and was
therefore unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 5, of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974." 9 This holding effectively closes the door on the
ability of the police to conduct random DWI roadblocks in Louisiana.
Though the checks may meet Fourth Amendment standards by being
conducted according to administrative guidelines which eliminate ran-
domness, 9' the extended right of privacy offered by the Louisiana Con-
stitution renders these particular stops by policemen unconstitutional
simply by the fact that they are made without either reasonable suspicion
or probable cause. 92
84. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982).
85. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
86. 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988).
87. Id. at 1302-03.
88. Id. at 1303.
89. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
90. Id. at 998.
91. See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) and discussion supra
text accompanying note 9.
92. Church, 538 So. 2d at 997-98. See also State v. Matthews, 366 So. 2d 1348 (La.




B. Wildlife Agents in Louisiana: State v. Longlois
Consistent with other state and federal courts, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has indicated that a wildlife agent's authority is determined com-
pletely by the empowering statutes. In State v. Longlois93 a wildlife
agent arrested two individuals he saw smoking marijuana in their car
in the woods. The court found that the agent acted beyond the limited
powers conferred on him by the statute granting wildlife agents their
authority to arrest. The statute empowering the agent at the time he
effected the arrests did not expressly provide that a wildlife agent had
the authority of a general law enforcement officer to cause an arrest
for a narcotics violation. 94 Since the agent did not have the statutory
authority to make the arrest, the supreme court found the arrest "un-
reasonable" and, thus, unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitu-
tion. 9 This holding adopts for Louisiana what is the status quo in most
other states-that a game warden is not a general enforcement officer
of the State; his authority is wholly derived from the state statutes.
Because Longlois has not been overruled, a wildlife agent in Louisiana
needs statutory authority to make random field stops if these seizures
are to be reasonable.
1. The Statutory Scheme
After Longlois, the Louisiana Legislature drastically changed the
powers granted to wildlife agents. The 1985 Louisiana Legislative Session
repealed the statute in place at the time of the arrest in Longlois and
enacted what is now Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:55.2.96 This statute
provides that those wildlife agents who have completed cerfain training
requirements have the same police authority as other law enforcement
officers of the state. 97 All wildlife agents now go through the training
93. 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979).
94. Id. at 1210.
95. Id.
96. 1985 La. Acts No. 876 repealed La. R.S. 56:108 and enacted La. R.S. 56:55.2,
which contains substantially the same material as subsection (H) of La. R.S. 56:108, as
amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 186, § i.
97. La. R.S. 56:55.2(A) (Supp. 1992) provides:
A. in view of the vast expanse of marsh and isolated wildlife habitat extant
throughout the state, and to facilitate the effective protection of private and
public rights and property, particularly in but not limited to these isolated areas,
duly commissioned wildlife officers and agents of the enforcement division ...
of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries who have graduated from [a specified
training program] ... and those commissioned wildlife officers ... who are
presently serving in the department prior to June 26, 1989, shall, in addition
to the authority otherwise conferred by law upon such officers, be vested with
the same authority and powers conferred by law upon other law enforcement
officers of this state, provided that a qualification and requalification for firearms
used be established within the department ....
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required by the statute, and thus enjoy complete law enforcement au-
thority. The infirmities found by the Longlois court to reverse that
conviction are now gone since wildlife agents in Louisiana presently
have the same arrest powers as any State Police officer. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 56:54 supplements the powers of 56:55.2 by granting
commissioned wildlife agents the authority to cause an arrest for fish
and game violations. 98 This provides the basic authority necessary to
enforce state game laws. Without this provision, the agent would be
powerless to enforce game law in the field. 99
But to remain true to the state constitutional requirements of Lon-
glois, a wildlife agent in Louisiana must also have the statutory authority
to perform an investigatory check without probable cause." 3 Three dis-
parate statutes may provide this authority. Louisiana Revised Statutes
56:54(A) imposes a duty on wildlife agents to see that every person
dealing in any way with the wildlife, fish, and game of the state has
an official license.10' Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:103(E) provides in
part that "Licensees shall have licenses in their possession when hunting
and shall exhibit them on demand of any person authorized to enforce
the provisions of this Subpart."'0 2 Under the "Fishing and Fish Industry
Licensing" Part of Title 56,103 Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:301.1 re-
98. La. R.S. 56.54(B) (1987) provides:
B. The assistant secretary of the office of forestry, employees of the office
of forestry, the secretary, commissioned wildlife agents, commissioned wildlife
sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, deputy constables, marshals, and other police
officers of this state may, without a warrant, arrest any person violating any
of the laws or regulations under the jurisdiction of the department, especially
R.S. 41:1009 and R.S. 56: 1478.1, and may immediately take such person in
custody for examination or trial before any officer or court of competent
jurisdiction of this state or of the United States, and may serve and execute
any warrant or other process issued by any officer or court of competent
jurisdiction of this state for the enforcement of such laws and regulations.
99. This grant is not exclusive to wildlife agents; it extends to all police officers of
the state.
100. See supra text accompanying note 93. In light of the plenary grant of law
enforcement authority to wildlife agents by La. R.S. 56:55.2, it would seem that the
concomitant authority to make warrantless searches in exigent circumstances would nec-
essarily attach. A traditional police officer can make searches without a warrant or probable
cause only with consent of the individual. Florida v. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. 2382, 2386
(1991). For any actions more intrusive than the limited inspection of game and gear that
is part of a reasonable "field check," the constitution would properly limit wildlife agents
to the "consent" exception as well.
101. La. R.S. 56:54(A) (1987) provides:
A. Wildlife agents shall see that every person dealing in any way in any
of the wildlife, fish, and game of the state in territory assigned to him for
which a license must be obtained, has in his possession, and is the owner of,
an official license.
102. La. R.S. 56:103 (1987).
103. La. R.S. 56:301-:308 (1987).
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quires persons taking fish to have a license in their possession and
"show such license upon demand to a duly authorized agent of the
department.' 0 4 These three statutes appear to be the sole basis on which
a wildlife agent can effect a stop of a person and request to see his
or her license. The statutes do not mention probable cause, and no case
has interpreted any of these sections. The issue then that remains un-
resolved is: does the statutory scheme allow stops by Louisiana wildlife
agents without probable cause?
It is interesting to note that the statute granting the authority to
effectuate searches contains a probable cause requirement., The lan-
guage of Section 55 has been interpreted to give the section its fullest
meaning. In Guilbeau v. Tate,' °6 the first circuit court of appeal inter-
preted former Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:108,107 the substance of
which has been reproduced nearly verbatim as Louisiana Revised Statutes
56:55, as allowing an agent to "'visit or examine, with or without a
search warrant ... any place ... whenever they have probable cause
to believe that any provision of this Sub-part has been violated." ' 8
This suggests that an agent with probable cause can search almost
anywhere. Both Guilbeau and the search statute impose a probable cause
requirement; similar to the licensing statutes, though, neither address
seizures of individuals.
As noted earlier, Louisiana wildlife agents are also obligated by
statute to conduct boating safety inspections.1t Louisiana Revised Sta-
104. La. R.S. 56:301.1(B) (1987).
105. La. R.S. 56:55(A) (1987) provides in part:
[A]ny commissioned wildlife agent may visit, inspect and examine, with or
without search warrant, records, any cold storage plant, warehouse, boat, store,
car, conveyance, automobile or other vehicle, airplane or other aircraft, basket
or other receptacle, or any place of deposit for wild birds, wild quadrupeds,
fish or other aquatic life or any parts thereof whenever there is probable cause
to believe that a violation has occurred. (Emphasis added).
106. 94 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
107. This statute was repealed by 1985 La. Acts No. 876, § 4. 1985 La. Acts No.
876, § 3 enacted La. R.S. 56:55.2, the current statute granting arrest authority to wildlife
agents. Former La. 56:108 contained the grant of both the arrest authority and the
authority necessary to cause a search. Presently, La. R.S. 56:55 provides the search
authority. The pertinent text of these two statutes is found supra notes 97 and 105.
108. Guilbeau, 94 So. 2d at 899 (quoting former La. R.S. 56:108 (repealed 1985)).
109. La. R.S. 34:851.29 (1985), provides that
It shall be the duty and responsibility of every wildlife agent . . . of this state
... to enforce the provisions of this Part, and in the exercise thereof, they
are hereby authorized to stop and board any vessel for the purpose of addressing
inquiries to those on board . . . and in addition, examinle] such vessel for
compliance with this Part. Officers so boarding any vessel shall first identify




tutes 34:851.29 provides that, for the purpose of enforcing boating safety
law, an agent is "authorized to stop and board any vessel." Consistent
with the previous licensing statutes, no statement on probable cause is
made. There has been no Louisiana case law that has addressed the
constitutionality of this section." 0 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has interpreted and upheld a similar statute that applies to
the Coast Guard.'
2. The Jurisprudence
Considering the number of hunters and fishermen in Louisiana, case
law addressing stops by wildlife agents is surprisingly limited. Even more
surprising is that much of the case law is the result of civil actions
against wildlife agents rather than criminal prosecutions of alleged poach-
ers.
Guilbeau v. Tate"2 involved a suit brought against a wildlife agent
for, inter alia, trespass and false imprisonment. Tate had entered onto
the plaintiff's land without probable cause under the guise of performing
a "routine check.""' There was, however, a history of conflict between
the two parties which prompted the court to find that Tate "was not
acting ... in good faith and without malice" when investigating the
plaintiff. " 4
The statutory scheme in place at the time allowed a wildlife agent
with probable cause to search almost anywhere." 5 However, the court
found that Tate had no probable cause to suspect a violation of the
law. Tate thus had no right to enter the plaintiff's property without a
search warrant, and the plaintiff did not consent to his entry. 16 Since
the agent was acting "outside of his strict authority," he "became an
ordinary trespasser"' 7 and was not acting as an officer in the perform-
ance of his duties.
110. Though the majority opinion did not address the constitutionality of the statute,
in State v. McHugh, 598 So. 2d 1171, 1176 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted, 605 So.
2d 1105 (1992), Judge Lanier wrote a concurring opinion that read in its entirety: "1
concur in the result. La. R.S. 34:851.29 is unconstitutional insofar as it is in conflict
with the United States Supreme Court decision of Delaware v. Prouse, [citation omitted],
and the Louisiana Supreme Court decision of State v. Parms." (Citations omitted). Id.
at 1176 (Lanier, J., concurring).
Ill. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983),
discussed supra note 14.
112. 94 So. 2d 896 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1957).
113. Id. at 897.
114. Id. at 900.
115. Id. at 899.
116. Id.
117. ,Id. at 900.
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Longlois, as discussed, continued this line of reasoning."' In Lon-
glois, a criminal case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the extent
of the statutory authority was the controlling factor." 9 Probable cause
was not at issue; Agent Carson had witnessed the individuals smoking
marijuana. But, as in Guilbeau, the agent exceeded the statutory au-
thority granted to him at the time. Consequently, Agent Carson was
acting as a private citizen when he effected the arrest. Simple possession
of marijuana is a misdemeanor, and private citizens may only arrest
for felonies; therefore, the arrest was illegal. 20 Clearly, Louisiana courts
take the view that the lack of statutory authority alone renders the
actions of a wildlife agent invalid.
Nevertheless, two recent cases have addressed the constitutionality
of investigatory stops by wildlife agents without approaching the issue
of statutory authority. Moresi v. State2' was a civil rights action in
which the court discussed the reasonableness of the actions of a wildlife
agent in conducting a search pursuant to what he, in good faith, thought
the law allowed. Because the court found that "the agents had a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting that the hunters were
engaged or had engaged in game violations," the issue of truly random
stops by wildlife agents was not decided.'22
The court did briefly discuss random game checks to support its
finding that the agents did not violate "clearly established statutory or
constitutional" rights: "It was not clear at the time of these searches,
and is still not today, whether the constitution or federal law prohibits
game agents from making random or checkpoint stops in the marsh for
the purpose of ensuring compliance with hunting and fishing laws.' 1 23
Justice Dennis then cited the Blackmun and Powell concurrence in Prouse
and several state court opinions approving random and checkpoint stops
by game agents. 24 Without reaching a decision on the issue, the court
stated that although it did "not necessarily agree with these authorities,
it cannot be said that their interpretations of the federal constitutional
jurisprudence is unreasonable."'2 5 The court also conceded that "rea-
sonable jurists may disagree as to whether the Church-Parms holding
involving motor vehicle sobriety checkpoints is directly and fully con-
trolling with respect to game agents' stops of sportsmen in the marsh
118. State v. Longlois, 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979), discussed supra text accompanying
note 93.
119. Id. at 1210.
120. Id.
121. 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990).
122. Id. at 1087.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1087-89.
125. Id. at 1089.
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for questioning with respect to possible game or boating violations."' 2 6
Justice Marcus concurred in the result of Moresi, expressly agreeing
with the other states who have upheld random stops of vehicles by
wildlife agents. 27 However, the issue of random stops by wildlife agents
remains unresolved, with the majority opinion concealing the direction
the court will take when the issue is squarely presented.
The recent first circuit case of State v. McHugh'28 addresses the
issue of game checks made during the course of a boating safety check.
Returning by boat from a weekend hunting trip, McHugh and several
others were stopped by six Louisiana wildlife agents. The agents were
"conducting game violation and boat safety checks."'129 After stopping
the McHugh party's boats, an agent asked if they had been hunting or
fishing. A buck head was visible in the boat's live well, and one member
of the party let the agents view a dressed and quartered deer in an ice
chest. Since the deer was not tagged, 30 the agents cited the occupants
of the boat and confiscated the deer carcass.
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence of the illegally possessed
deer, claiming the initial stop was unconstitutional. The trial court denied
the motion without making an inquiry into probable cause, suggesting
that wildlife agents could make these types of stops. The first circuit
court of appeal took exception to this premise, conducted its own inquiry
into the facts, and found that no probable cause existed.' 3' A discussion
of Prouse, Parms, and Church immediately followed.
The court made efforts to describe the unclear effect of the tra-
ditional roadblock cases on stops by wildlife agents. Recognizing that
"the issue presented ... is res nova,"'132 the court opted to apply Church
to the facts. True to Church, one reason for suppressing the evidence
was that the agents had no probable cause to stop the McHugh boats.
Another reason was that "the discretion of the agents in this case was
unbridled"'3 due to failure of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
to provide a manual or guidelines directing the procedure. The state
had also never established the effectiveness of the procedure. 3 4 Nor had
126. Id. at 1094.
127. Id. at 1096 (Marcus, J., concurring).
128. 598 So. 2d 1171 (La. App. ist Cir. 1992), writ granted, 605 So. 2d 1105 (1992).
129. Id. at 1172.
130. La. R.S. 56:125(B) (1987) requires that any deer that has been "divided" must
have a tag on each part indicating the sex of the animal, the date taken, and the name
of the individual hunter who killed the animal.
131. McHugh, 598 So. 2d at 1174. The testimony of one of the agents supports this
finding: "Sgt. Miculek candidly admitted that, prior to stopping defendants, he had no
reason to believe that defendants had committed a game violation." Id.
132. Id. at 1175.
133. Id. at 1176.
134. Id.
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the state established or attempted to establish that "less intrusive methods
were not available."'13 5 This reasoning is classic Church.
As the most recent word on this issue, McHugh leaves some im-
portant issues unresolved. The court noted that the wildlife agents had
a statutory obligation to make boating safety inspections and the statute
that grants agents the authority to effect a search. 3 6 Also noted was
the statute that grants wildlife agents the same authority as other law
enforcement officers.'37 However, the court did not mention the re-
mainder of the statutory scheme defining the agent's authority. In light
of Longlois, the meaning of this omission is unclear; would the court
have addressed the statutory issue only if it had found first that the
stop was constitutional? Does this suggest a weakening of the Longlois
holding?
The court did suggest that one way of upholding random stops by
wildlife agents would be to distinguish Church by recognizing "the
peculiar nature of wildlife enforcement."' 38 Even so, continued the court,
this alone would not be enough; the amount of discretion the agents
had would have rendered the procedure infirm, presumably under
Prouse.'3 9 This raises another unresolved issue: To what extent must the
discretion of the agents be constrained? If only hunters and fishermen
are being stopped, is not any discretion minimal? Or must there be no
discretion even within the limited group of individuals that wildlife agents
are statutorily obligated to regulate?
IV. SUGGESTIONS ON RESOLVING THE ISSUE IN LOUISLNA
Despite the questions left by McHugh, there are still several valid
means by which a court can recognize that wildlife agents enjoy a limited
exception to the probable cause requirement of traditional search and
seizure law. These approaches are generally discreet, but as long as
Longlois remains the law every analysis of the constitutionality of a
wildlife agent's actions must begin with a discussion of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature.
A. Interpretation of the Statutes
As noted earlier, there are three statutes in Louisiana that may apply
to random stops by wildlife agents. Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:54(A)
requires wildlife agents to check that every person dealing in any way
135.. Id.
136. Id. at 1172-73 (citing La. R.S. 34:851.29 and La. R.S. 56:55(A)), see supra notes
105 and 109.
137. Id. at 1174 (citing La. 56:55.2(A)), see supra note 97.




with the wildlife, fish, and game of the state is properly licensed.' 40
Supplementing this are two specific licensing provisions, one addressing
hunters, the other addressing fishermen. In the "Wild Birds and Wild
Quadrupeds" Sub-part of Title 56, Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:103(E)
provides that "[Ilicensees shall have licenses in their possession when
hunting and shall exhibit them on demand of any person authorized to
enforce the provisions of this Subpart."' 4' Similarly, under "Fishing and
Fish Industry Licensing,' ' 42 Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:301.1(B) re-
quires persons taking fish to possess a license and "show such license
upon demand to a duly authorized agent of the department.' 4 3
Neither Section 103(E) nor Section 301.1(B) requires that the agent
have probable cause before "demanding" a person's license. On the
other hand, neither statute explicitly allows the agent to act without
probable cause. But this lack of specificity is actually immaterial to the
agent's authority. These two statutes are directed at the licensees, not
the agents. Section 103(E) and 301.1(B) mandate presentation of the
license; the only requirement is that the person demanding the license
be authorized to enforce the provisions. The question now becomes
whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:54(A) requires that an agent have
probable cause before demanding a person present his or her license.
Section 54 does not mention probable cause; Louisiana Revised
Statutes 56:55; which grants wildlife agents authority to conduct searches,
however, does mention probable cause.'" Section 55 only allows a wildlife
agent to make a search when probable cause is present. By interpreting
these two statutes in pari materia, similar to the approach used by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Drane,41 it seems that the Louisiana
Legislature intended to allow wildlife agents to make a license check
without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. A demand for a
license is far less intrusive than a search, and any greater intrusion
should require probable cause.'"
140. See supra text at note 101.
141. La. R.S. 56:103 (1987).
142. La. R.S. 56:301-:308 (1987).
143. La. R.S. 56:301.1 (1987).
144. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
145. Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.
Ct. 3189 (1987), see supra text accompanying note 80.
146. The validity of this position is supported by further action of the Louisiana
Legislature. By enacting La. R.S. 302.1(4) (added by 1986 La. Acts No. 904, § 1), the
legislature provided another exception to the probable cause requirement of La. R.S.
56:55. This section, which pertains to licensing procedures and costs, provides in part
that "[a]n enforcement agent or officer may inspect a fisherman's catch to insure com-
pliance with this Paragraph." La. R.S. 302.1(4) (1987). The lack of a probable cause
requirement here shows that the scheme of La. R.S. 56:55 is designed to limit substantial
intrusions, which a brief license check pursuant to La. R.S. 56:54 or a brief tallying of
the number and type of fish caught clearly are not.
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B. Analyzing Random Stops by Louisiana Wildlife Agents
A finding of statutory authority does not in itself render a stop
constitutional. Authority is merely a starting point. 47 The fact that a
person is being detained by a government agent invokes the protections
of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I of the Louisiana consti-
tution. Though neither provision expressly requires probable cause, both
require that the stop be reasonable. 4 Despite the method or test used,
the unique practical aspects of a wildlife agent's responsibilities support
a finding that it is reasonable for these agents to enjoy a limited exception
to the probable cause requirement. Several aspects of the different
methods are similar, but each method can autonomously support the
reasonableness of this activity.
1. A Prouse, Church, or McHugh-Type Analysis
Prouse and Church (and Church's genesis, Parms) relied on several
common factors in testing the constitutionality of roadblock stops by
traditional police agencies. The roadblocks may comply with the Fourth
Amendment when "the government interest is compelling, the intrusion
minimal, and adequate neutral criteria are present."' 4 9
That fish and game preservation is a "compelling interest" of the
state is evidenced by the amount of statutory and regulatory attention
it receives. 50 In McHugh, the first circuit court of appeal recognized
the extreme importance of game preservation but was not willing to say
that it "exceeds that of human life, requiring us to suspend constitutional
rights in wildlife cases, but not in cases involving drunk drivers or
narcotics violations.""'5 This statement suggests that a "compelling in-
terest" alone is sufficient to support random stops. However, this is an
incorrect application of the tests of Prouse and Church. There is no
"comparison" to other state interests in the balancing test. Prouse and
Church describe a test in which each aspect of a random stop is weighed
against the others. Even assuming that the prevention of drunk driving
147. State v. Longlois, 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979).
148. A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless it is justified by
a specific exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967).
149. State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 996 (La. 1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
150. The term "compelling interest" is a term of art and has several different meanings
which vary according to the type of analysis used. A "compelling interest" in an equal
protection analysis might not be a "compelling interest" in a due process analysis, and
vice versa.
151. State v. McHugh, 598 So. 2d 1171, 1176 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted,
605 So. 2d 1105 (1992).
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reached the highest possible level of "compelling," random stops of
drivers would be unreasonable and thus unconstitutional if the procedure
used was too intrusive, if those involved had unbridled discretion, or
if the method used was grossly ineffective.'52 When balanced against the
minimal intrusion and high effectiveness of random game stops, as well
as the statutorily limited discretion of an agent, the compelling state
interest of effective game preservation is clearly sufficient to warrant a
limited exception to the probable cause requirement.
The brevity and limited scope of a typical, and more importantly,
reasonable random check by a wildlife agent demonstrates the minimal
intrusion required by Prouse and Church. The extent of an agent's
activity should be a request for and inspection of any required licenses.
A cursory inspection of any gear and game possessed may also be made.
Should probable cause exist, more intrusive measures may be allowed.' a
The nature of the violations involved demonstrates the effectiveness
of allowing these stops. A poison-tipped arrow looks like a legal arrow
unless it is held in one's hands; an illegal eleven inch speckled trout
looks the same through a pair of binoculars as does a legal twelve inch
fish. It may take a fisherman eight hours and several stops to take over
his daily limit of fish. Short of following every fisherman in the state
and counting each and every fish he keeps, there is no other way to
ensure compliance with creel limits set on a biological basis than to
allow wildlife agents the ability to count the fish in his box unannounced.
The Louisiana Legislature has removed the discretion of wildlife
agents by specifying that the agent "shall" check "every person" dealing
in any way with the wildlife of the state. 5 4 Thus, any individual whose
activity could reasonably be interpreted as hunting or fishing must be
stopped. No discretion is afforded the agent. This mandate, however,
adds another step to the traditional analysis. Courts would have to make
an initial determination that the person stopped met some sort of limited
"sportsman's profile" that warranted the agent's actions.,
As McHugh recognized, Church added a probable cause requirement
to the Prouse test. 5 6 In light of traditional police activities, this seems
152. This was the case in both Prouse and Church.
153. These are the parameters of a reasonable "field check" as applied to either the
individual hunter on foot, in a vehicle in an area known to support hunting, or operating
a boat. The limited exception to probable cause should not extend any further than this
context when wildlife agents are enforcing game and fish law. A wildlife agent who acts
beyond the scope of a reasonable limited "field check" is acting as a quasi-police officer
or quasi-drug agent and should be held to the same constitutional standards.
154. La. R.S. 56:54(A) (1987).
155. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
156. State v. McHugh, 598 So. 2d 1171, 1174-75 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted,
605 So. 2d 1105 (1992).
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appropriate, especially given the enhanced protections granted by the
Louisiana Constitution.'57 But wildlife agents do not engage in traditional
police pursuits (e.g., drug intervention, DWI checks, pursuing fugitives).
To use the Church test will require that an exception to the strict
probable cause requirement be recognized in this limited application.
At the roadblock found unconstitutional in Church, 949 vehicles
were stopped in three hours, thirteen of which had intoxicated drivers.','
The simple magnitude of this endeavor, its relative inefficiency not-
withstanding, justifiably stirs a visceral reaction that something more
than what the Fourth Amendment offers is needed to stop this. All the
court had left to use was probable cause which, after Hernandez, could
be based on Article I, Section 5. The inverse of the Church reasoning
is just as strong a reason for wildlife agents to enjoy a limited exception
to the probable cause requirement. A typical wildlife agent will not stop
949 people in a year, much less in three hours. The sheer expanse of
land for which each agent is responsible, the limited resources available
to him, the increasingly important need for efficient harvesting of these
finite resources, and the lack of any externally detectable indicia of
illegal activity stirs a reaction equal to that presumably felt by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Church that something needs to be done
to enable a wildlife agent to ensure that a given individual is licensed
to participate in the voluntary activity' and has harvested only the
amount of natural resources that scientific research has determined will
allow those natural resources to perpetuate. Limited relief from the
probable cause requirement is the only plausible solution, and, given
the probable cause requirement of Church, is necessary to afford wildlife
agents the authority to stop and check individuals believed to be hunting
or fishing.
2. Through an "Implied Consent" Theory
A finding that Church is distinguishable from the factual situation
discussed above, as alluded to in McHugh, still leaves open other means
of supporting the reasonableness of random checks by wildlife agents.
The easiest method would be for a court to find that by "engaging in
activity that may reasonably be interpreted as hunting" or fishing, an
individual "knows that he or she may be stopped briefly and asked to
display a license. ' ' 6° This would place the stop within the "consent"
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 6'
157. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
158. State v. Church, 530 So. 2d 993, 997 (La. 1989).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
160. State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1988).
161. Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991).
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Using "implied consent" contains an inherent truth that makes this
approach less subject to criticism or evasion than does the Prouse or
Church/McHugh analysis. Hunting and fishing are for the most part
luxuries, both of which are subject to pervasive state regulation. Driving,
in comparison, is also pervasively regulated, but driving is a necessary
requisite of life in most areas today. 62 This distinction gives the "implied
consent" argument substantial credibility.
This type of analysis does require some kind of objective criteria
which establishes the consent. Keehner and Layton used a "hunter's
profile" as a means of determining that an individual consented to being
checked by a wildlife agent.' 6 The test, in order to justify this particular
exception, must limit the discretion of the wildlife agent to a point that
he or she may only stop those who are "engaged in an activity which
may be reasonably interpreted as hunting"' or fishing. 65 Case by case
determinations by the courts would easily establish the parameters, but
the actual scope of this test is fairly well self-defined. Clearly, an
individual with a gun in the woods or a person with a fishing pole
next to a lake is within the scope. Just as clear, a couple enjoying a
sunset should not be checked for hunting licenses. The middle ground
would need judicial guidance, possibly with deference to the experienced
wildlife agent, analogous to the deference given to an experienced police
officer,' 66 but with a requirement that the agent articulate his basis for
believing the person checked was hunting or fishing.
3. The "Administrative Search" Exception
Using an administrative search approach offers another means of
demonstrating the reasonableness of these checks. The tests set out in
New York v. Burger 67 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association' 6 are readily applicable to random checks by wildlife agents
of commercial fishermen. Both also apply to random checks of recre-
ational sportsmen because of the nature of the pursuit involved; the
complex cumulation of statutes and regulations is geared towards the
protection and perpetuation of finite natural resources, as opposed to
prescribing activity that protects citizens from themselves and others.
162. See John Michael Harlow, Note, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of
a Loyal Foot Soldier, 52 La. L. Rev. 1205, 1206, 1237 (1992), for a discussion of the
development and importance of the automobile in the United States.
163. State v. Keehner 425 N.W.2d 41, 44-45 (Iowa 1988); People v. Layton, 552
N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (11. App. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (1990).
164. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d at 45.
165. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
166. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
167. 482 U.S. 691, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
168. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
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The tests also apply, probably more so than the Prouse test, to boating
safety checks. 6 9
By applying the Camara criteria for a reasonable administrative
inspection and the Burger/Skinner tests for a probable cause exception,
it is evident that limited random game checks by wildlife agents are
well within the bounds of reasonableness. First, Camara requires a long
history of both judicial and public acceptance of the particular type of
search; the public has long accepted limited random game checks. A
Louisiana wildlife agent is obligated by statute to stop every person he
encounters. This has been the law since 1912.170 The limited case law
that has arisen out of the amount of people checked each year can
only demonstrate the assumption carried by sportsmen and poachers
alike: if an agent comes across someone who appears to be hunting or
fishing, a brief check is sure to follow. Second, Camara requires that
there be a state interest in preventing the conditions with no alternative
means of enforcement.' 7' The state is interested in preserving the finite
fish and game resources that depend on the powers of government for
protection. As discussed earlier, the functional realities of game and
fish violations do not lend themselves to detection through general
observations. Brief, limited checks of licenses, gear, and game are the
only practical methods of ensuring compliance with state-imposed har-
vesting methods and limits.
Finally, administrative inspections must also be impersonal in nature
and not aimed at discovering evidence of a crime.7 2 Wildlife agents do
not search an individual's person during a proper field check; the agent
makes only cursory inspections of licenses, gear, and game. The detection
of criminal activity aside from fish and game violations is an occasional
result of these checks, however. This seems contrary to the general rule
that administrative searches are not proper methods of gathering evidence
of criminal activity. 7 Burger did not make this distinction, however,
169. Most boats have certain minimum safety equipment requirements (e.g., life pres-
ervers, fire extinguishers, flare guns). Automobiles also have minimum equipment re-
quirements and are subject to annual certifications. A car with the proper equipment
(properly functioning brakes and lights) carries a certification sticker that indicates this.
No such indicia is used for boats. Indeed, it would be pointless to attempt to use such
a system for boats because of the ease with which life preservers and the other safety
equipment could be removed and transferred between vessels. As there is no functional
indicia of an improperly equipped boat, unannounced inspections provides the only practical
method available to ensure compliance.
170. The absence of a "long history of judicial acceptance," or even judicial disap-
proval, of these stops in Louisiana is the basis of this comment and, presumably, the
Louisiana Supreme Court's desire to review State v. McHugh.
171. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
1735 (1967).
172. Id.
173. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S. Ct. 641, 647 (1984).
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finding no reason to render an administrative search unconstitutional
on the sole basis that crimes had been discovered which were unrelated
to the particular scheme being pursued. 174
Burger also established when probable cause or a warrant was not
a prerequisite to an administrative search. An inspection may be made
without probable cause only when the inspection is authorized by a
limiting statute, the governmental interest is "substantial," and the
random checks are "necessary to further the regulatory scheme."' 175
Skinner adds to this a "special needs" exception, to be used only when
a probable cause requirement is "impracticable."' 76
The statute obligating a wildlife agent to effectuate license checks
removes all discretion from the activity; he must stop every person he
encounters. Whether game management is a "substantial" interest, though,
has not been decided by the courts. In light of the expansive statutory,
regulatory, and budgetary attention given to it, however, a court would
be hard pressed to say that Louisiana has only a minimal interest in
properly managing its wildlife and fisheries resources. Balanced against
the other factors, the degree of the state's interest is sufficient to warrant
these minimal intrusions.
This balancing is suggested by the Skinner "special needs" exception.
By balancing the governmental interests in effective game management
against the privacy interests of a sportsman and the impracticality of a
probable cause requirement in this context, a "special need" is dem-
onstrated that justifies an exception.
V. CONCLUSION
In Parms, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited substantial case law
from other state supreme courts as guidance in its decision. 7  The first
case the court cited was State v. Tourtillott,7 1 which mentioned that
the Oregon constitution, like Louisiana, offers greater protection of an
174. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2651 (1987); This is
also consistent with the "plain view" doctrine discussed in Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 133-44, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2306 (1990). This doctrine recognizes that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect things discovered or viewed by a police officer who is
lawfully positioned.
175. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03, 107 S. Ct. at 2644.
176. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
1414; A "special need" is recognized when there is "'beyond the normal need for law
enforcement' a situation that "'make[s] the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable."' Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 3164,
3168 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733, 748 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring))).
177. State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1296-1301 (La. 1988).
178. See discussion supra text accompanying note 37.
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individual's right of privacy than the Fourth Amendment. 79 The court
also cited South Dakota and Illinois Supreme court cases which held
that random DWI checkpoints by police officers without probable cause
violate their respective state constitutions. 80 However, these same states
have also held that the importance of proper wildlife management war-
rants random checks of a limited nature by wildlife agents, and as such
this activity is constitutional.18' Though only persuasive authority, these
cases indicate a recognition by other states that the extended protections
of their respective constitutions are dynamic enough to adapt to the
unique functional aspects, and more importantly the practical results,
of a wildlife agent's responsibilities.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Louisiana Supreme
Court has decided the constitutionality of these stops. One can only
hope that when this happens the court will keep in mind the fate of
the carrier pigeon, the bald eagle, and the recent decimation of Louis-
iana's red drum and speckled trout fisheries. Proper game management
has allowed the white-tailed deer population in Louisiana to reach the
highest level in recorded history; the American alligator has been removed
from the threatened species list as a direct result of state-imposed and
regulated harvesting programs.
Without the ability to ensure that individuals involved in the taking
of wild game or fish do so within legal guidelines, the efforts of more
than just the wildlife agents are frustrated. Administrators weigh bio-
logical data against political pressure to determine what limits are the
most beneficial to all involved, including the animals. Biologists spend
countless hours in the field studying populations and data to determine
what, if any, amount of thinning is needed to maintain or improve the
conditions of an area. For nothing more than a love for the outdoors,
thousands of individuals spend hundreds of thousands of dollars a year
to participate in what has become a part of the heritage of Louisiana.
Wildlife agents do not. need constitutional carte blanche to satisfy
these interests; as discussed, however, the limited random stops conducted
by wildlife agents are a constitutionally reasonable method of ensuring
compliance with state fish and game law. A court has several bases for
upholding this activity when it is properly analyzed in its totality. Only
by recognizing this limited exception will effective game management be
able to continue. A refusal to do so invites uncontrollable exploitation
179. Parms, 523 So. 2d at 1296.
180. Id. at 1297 (citing State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976)), 1299 (citing
People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880 (I11. 1985)).
181. See the discussions of Layton (Illinois), supra note 61 and accompanying text;
Tourtillott (Oregon), supra note 37 and accompanying text; and Halverson (South Dakota),
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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of the finite natural resources that have come to depend on the abilities
of government for their protection.
Donald C. Douglas, Jr.

